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1 
INTEREST OF AMICI  
 Pursuant to the Court’s Order of October 19, 2020 (ECF No. 26), Professors Crocker and 
Hasbrouck file this brief.  They are scholars of civil rights with an interest in the sound 
development of the Bivens doctrine and qualified immunity.  Professor Crocker is an Assistant 
Professor of Law at William & Mary Law School.  Professor Hasbrouck is an Assistant Professor 
of Law at Washington and Lee School of Law.  They express solely their own views and not any 
views of their institutions.1 
INTRODUCTION 
This case illustrates how the First Amendment functions as an essential backstop to Fourth 
Amendment freedoms—and vice versa.  As revealed by the national response to the killing of 
George Floyd and so many similar injustices, the ability to record encounters with government 
representatives is critical to preserving civil rights, and especially the right to avoid excessive 
force.  The public only “became aware of the circumstances surrounding George Floyd’s death 
because citizens standing on a sidewalk exercised their First Amendment rights and filmed a police 
officer kneeling on Floyd’s neck until he died.”  Index Newspapers LLC v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 
977 F.3d 817, 831 (9th Cir. 2020).  Indeed, “the proliferation of bystander videos has spurred 
action at all levels of government to address police misconduct and to protect civil rights.”  Fields 
v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted).  In assessing 
this case, the Court should keep in mind the powerful role that video recording can play in 
protecting the public—especially communities of color—from abusive government conduct. 
                                                 
 
1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a)(4)(E), Amici declare that no 
party’s counsel authored the brief in whole or in part; that no party or party’s counsel contributed 
money intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief; and that no person, other than Amici, 
their members or their counsel, contributed money intended to fund preparing or submitting the 
brief. 




In Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Supreme Court outlined a two-step framework for analyzing the 
availability of Bivens remedies.  137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857–58 (2017).  The Court applied the same 
approach in its most recent Bivens case, Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020).  Under 
this framework, “[a] court must first consider whether a case presents a new Bivens context.”  Doe 
v. Meron, 929 F.3d 153, 167–68 (4th Cir. 2019).  If so, it “must then conduct a special factors 
analysis to determine whether an action should proceed.”  Id. at 168.  This analysis asks “whether 
the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the 
costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.”  Id. (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 
1858).  If a factor “cause[s] a court to hesitate before answering . . . in the affirmative,” id. (quoting 
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1858), it should “reject the request” to recognize a Bivens claim, Hernández, 
140 S. Ct. at 743. 
For qualified immunity, the doctrine asks “whether a constitutional violation occurred and 
whether the right violated was clearly established at the time of the official’s conduct.”  Booker v. 
S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted).  The Supreme 
Court has encouraged tribunals to address both questions in some situations.  See Pearson v. 
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).  But courts may “take these steps in either order,” such that 
answering the clearly-established question in the negative can render answering the constitutional-
violation question unnecessary.  Booker, 855 F.3d at 538. 
I. There are good reasons to recognize a Bivens action against TSA agents who violate 
airline passengers’ Fourth and First Amendment rights. 
Abbasi and Hernández confirm that the Supreme Court approaches extending Bivens to 
new contexts with extreme skepticism.  See Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 742–43 (“We have stated 
that expansion of Bivens is ‘a disfavored judicial activity’ and have gone so far as to observe that 
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3 
if ‘the Court’s three Bivens cases [had] been . . . decided today,’ it is doubtful that we would have 
reached the same result.” (alterations in original) (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856–57)).  But 
Abbasi and Hernández do not prohibit courts from recognizing additional Bivens claims.  Instead, 
in the face of separate opinions directly or indirectly urging the Bivens regime’s repudiation, see 
Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 750–53 (Thomas, J., concurring); Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1869–70 (Thomas, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), the Supreme Court again chose to preserve 
a (narrow) path to expansion. 
With this backdrop in mind, recognizing both Fourth and First Amendment Bivens claims 
in the present case would be legally and logically justified. 
A. Fourth and First Amendment Bivens actions against TSA agents are consistent 
with prior cases from the Fourth Circuit and the Eastern District. 
The Fourth Circuit has assumed the viability of Bivens claims against TSA agents.  In 
Tobey v. Jones, an airline passenger sued TSA agents, alleging that they violated his Fourth and 
First Amendment rights when they called airport police, leading to his arrest, after he removed his 
shirt in a screening line to reveal the Fourth Amendment’s text on his chest.  706 F.3d 379, 383–
84 (4th Cir. 2013).  Reviewing a decision by Judge Hudson, the Fourth Circuit reversed the 
dismissal of the First Amendment claim, declaring it “crystal clear that the First Amendment 
protects peaceful nondisruptive speech in an airport” and concluding that the plaintiff “adequately 
pled that [the TSA agents] violated his clearly established First Amendment rights.”  Id. at 391, 
394. 
Tobey did not expressly address the existence of a Bivens remedy, and the Fourth 
Amendment claim was not technically at issue because it had been dismissed on grounds not 
allowing an interlocutory appeal.  But the fact that the majority framed the issue as “whether [the 
plaintiff] alleged plausible Bivens claims against [the TSA agents],” id. at 386, and that the dissent 
Case 3:19-cv-00921-JAG   Document 30   Filed 12/11/20   Page 9 of 28 PageID# 110
 
4 
specifically noted a question about “[w]hether the cause of action asserted by [the plaintiff] would 
lie under Bivens,” id. at 405 n.* (Wilkinson, J., dissenting), indicates that the Fourth Circuit 
assumed the viability of the First Amendment Bivens theory.  There can be little doubt that the 
court did the same for the Fourth Amendment claim.  See id. at 389 (majority opinion) (stating that 
“the district court’s Fourth Amendment holding is undermined by its erroneous conclusion that 
[the TSA agents] cannot be found liable for [the plaintiff’s] arrest”). 
The Eastern District has gone even further in the TSA-defendant context than Tobey did.  
In Linlor v. Polson, Judge Cacheris recognized a Fourth Amendment Bivens claim where the 
plaintiff sued a TSA agent for excessive force on allegations that the agent intentionally or 
recklessly “struck him in the groin” during a screening-line pat-down.  263 F. Supp. 3d 613, 617–
18 (E.D. Va. 2017).  Linlor found Tobey’s “suggest[ion] that the airport setting does not, in and of 
itself, insulate federal officers from constitutional claims” especially “salient[].”  Id. at 620. 
In the First Amendment context, the Supreme Court has repeatedly assumed the existence 
of Bivens claims, including as recently as 2014.  See Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 757 (2014).  
And Tobey is consistent with decades of Fourth Circuit rulings.  See Korb v. Lehman, 919 F.2d 
243, 248 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that “[w]e believe a Bivens action should . . . exist” in a First 
Amendment retaliation context but affirming dismissal on qualified-immunity grounds); see also 
Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 397 (4th Cir. 2001) (concluding that “the complaint sufficiently 
pleads a claim under the First Amendment” without addressing the Bivens question). 
Some courts since Abbasi have declined to recognize First Amendment Bivens actions 
when implementing the Supreme Court’s restrictive approach.  Although Vanderklok v. United 
States, 868 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2017), provides an exception, these cases are generally 
distinguishable because they rely on circumstances not present here.  Some point to factors 
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particular to the prison and retaliation-claim contexts.  See, e.g., Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311, 322–
25 (3d Cir. 2020).  Some place weight on alternative remedial schemes.  See, e.g., Mack, 968 F.3d 
at 320–21; Loumiet v. United States, 948 F.3d 376, 384–85 (D.C. Cir. 2020).  And the Fourth 
Circuit rested its decision in Doe on “the existence of an alternative remedial scheme . . . under 
the Military Claims Act” and on the fact that the plaintiff’s “claims arose in a military context” 
and “would extend Bivens extraterritorially.”  929 F.3d at 169–70. 
Even acknowledging the Supreme Court’s increasing hostility to Bivens actions, case law 
provides support for recognizing Fourth and First Amendment Bivens claims here. 
B. Fourth and First Amendment Bivens actions against TSA agents are consistent 
with the Bill of Rights’ core concerns and history. 
Considered in light of the Bill of Rights’ purposes and foundations, the critical role that 
cell-phone videos play in public discourse supports addressing their improper search and seizure 
through Bivens actions.   
The Fourth Amendment protects against both violating a person’s reasonable expectations 
of privacy and trespassing against a person’s property.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 
(2012).  Federal courts have repeatedly recognized that cell phones trigger Fourth Amendment 
safeguards.  See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (referring to the 
collection of cell-phone location data as a tool that “risks Government encroachment of the sort 
the Framers . . . drafted the Fourth Amendment to prevent”).  Dyer’s allegations implicate both the 
Fourth Amendment’s traditional property concerns, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 217 (“A 
trespass to a chattel may be committed by intentionally . . . using or intermeddling with a chattel 
in possession of another.”), and its modern privacy concerns, see Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 
403 (2014) (requiring warrants to search cell phones because they frequently contain “the privacies 
of life” (internal quotation omitted)); United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713, 722 (4th Cir. 2019) 
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(stating that cell phones “feature ‘an element of pervasiveness’” that “‘implicate[s] privacy 
concerns far beyond those implicated’ by physical searches” (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 393, 395)). 
“The protection of citizens’ right to speak publicly on matters of public concern . . . is at 
the very heart of the First Amendment.”  Korb, 919 F.2d at 247.  Dyer’s allegations implicate this 
core concern as well.  For the First Amendment secures “the right to gather information about what 
public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest.”  
Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 
F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Gathering information about government officials in a form that can 
readily be disseminated to others serves a cardinal First Amendment interest in protecting and 
promoting ‘the free discussion of governmental affairs.’” (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 
218 (1966)).   
The historical underpinnings of the Fourth and First Amendments demonstrate why Dyer’s 
allegations strike at the heart of these constitutional protections.  The English cases of John Entick 
and John Wilkes were central to the Fourth Amendment’s development.  See Stanford v. Texas, 
379 U.S. 476, 481–85 (1965); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624–30 (1886).  Entick and 
Wilkes were “both authors of political pamphlets critical of the King’s ministers,” and “[a]s a 
consequence, both suffered the ransacking of their homes and the seizure of all their books and 
papers.”  William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 Yale L.J. 393, 
397 (1995).  They “both sued the officials who ordered or carried out the searches,” and “both won 
(and collected substantial damages).”  Id.  “[I]n both cases Chief Justice Pratt (later Lord Camden) 
offered ringing declarations about the importance of limiting executive power to search for and 
seize private papers in private homes.”  Id.  But he also declared that a trespass against papers 
offended personal freedom more than a trespass against a home alone—and thus justified greater 
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damages.  Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1066 (C.P. 1765) (“Papers are the 
owner’s . . . dearest property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an 
inspection; and . . . where private papers are removed and carried away, the secret nature of those 
goods will be an aggravation of the trespass, and demand more considerable damages in that 
respect.”). 
The Constitution’s framers understood the connection between the powers of search and 
seizure and the danger of suppressing dissent.  “The Bill of Rights was fashioned against the 
background of knowledge that unrestricted power of search and seizure could be an instrument for 
stifling liberty of expression.”  Stanford, 379 U.S. at 484 (internal quotation omitted).  The 
Supreme Court has explained that not only “the prohibitions of the Fourth [Amendment],” but also 
“[t]he commands of our First Amendment” and the dictates of the Fifth Amendment “reflect the 
teachings of Entick v. Carrington.”  Id. at 484–85 (internal quotation omitted).  For “[t]hese three 
amendments are indeed closely related, safeguarding not only privacy and protection against self-
incrimination but conscience and human dignity and freedom of expression as well.”  Id. at 485 
(internal quotation omitted). 
The alleged search of Dyer’s cell phone and seizure of a video of potential public import 
depicting government officials openly performing government functions echo the abuses that 
Entick and Wilkes suffered.  The Fourth and First Amendments were designed to counteract 
precisely this kind of mischief, and damages supplied the traditional remedy.  To the extent that 
any constitutional violations are compensable in damages today, the ones alleged here should be 
among them.  See Tanzin v. Tanvir, No. 19-71, 2020 WL 7250100, at *5 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2020) 
(“The Government also posits that we should be wary of damages against government officials 
because these awards could raise separation-of-powers concerns.  But this exact remedy has 
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coexisted with our constitutional system since the dawn of the Republic.”). 
C. Both claims present new Bivens contexts, but Defendants fail to invoke any 
special factors requiring the Court to decline to recognize damages remedies. 
Because the Supreme Court has never recognized a Bivens claim against TSA agents or for 
a First Amendment violation, Dyer’s claims present new contexts.  See Doe, 929 F.3d at 169 (First 
Amendment claim); Linlor, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 620 (Fourth Amendment claim against a TSA 
agent).  His suit’s viability thus turns on a special-factors analysis. 
1. Defendants cite no alternative remedial structure. 
The presence of “an alternative remedial structure” constitutes an especially important part 
of the special-factors inquiry.  Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858 (stating that this “alone may limit the 
power of the Judiciary to infer a new Bivens cause of action”).  The only framework Defendants 
cite is the Travelers Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) within the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS).  But TRIP appears to provide no relief to a party in Dyer’s circumstances. 
As an initial matter, Defendants’ reliance on Vanderklok is misplaced.  In Vanderklok, the 
Third Circuit “assume[d] for the sake of discussion that [the TRIP process] was not a meaningful 
remedy . . . because [it] appears to be used primarily as a means to challenge inclusion on terrorism 
watch lists.”  868 F.3d at 205 (emphasis added).  But given the facts,2 the Third Circuit also 
acknowledged that the plaintiff may have been able to utilize the program because he “was 
‘delayed or prohibited from boarding a commercial aircraft because [he was] wrongly identified 
                                                 
 
2 In Vanderklok, the TSA subjected the plaintiff to secondary screening because “[i]n his 
carry-on luggage, he had a heart monitor and watch stored inside a piece of PVC pipe that was 
capped on both ends.”  868 F.3d at 193.  The plaintiff alleged that the TSA agent supervising the 
screening “was disrespectful and aggressive,” causing the plaintiff to “state[] an intent to file a 
complaint.”  Id.  The plaintiff alleged that the TSA agent then falsely reported that the plaintiff had 
issued a bomb threat, which led to the plaintiff’s arrest.  Id. 
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as a threat’” within the terms of statutory law, id. (alteration in original) (quoting 49 U.S.C. 
§ 44926(a)), and believed he was “unfairly detained” within the terms of the TRIP website, id.  
The present case does not involve allegations related to a terrorism watch list.  It does not involve 
allegations that Dyer was delayed or denied boarding because he was deemed a threat.  Nor does 
it involve allegations that Dyer was detained in the same sense.   
This case does involve allegations that Dyer’s “‘civil rights [were] violated because [the] 
questioning or treatment during screening was abusive or coercive,’” which Vanderklok said the 
TRIP “online complaint form” allowed passengers to report.  Id.  Nowadays, however, language 
similar to the text the Third Circuit quoted directs users to a different DHS procedure, which 
Defendants do not cite here.  See DHS, Submitting the DHS TRIP Application, https://trip.dhs.gov/ 
(stating that “[i]f the traveler wishes to make a civil rights and civil liberties complaint, he/she may 
use the following link to learn more about the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
(CRCL) or use the CRCL Complaint Tool to file a complaint” and mentioning that the CRCL 
investigates allegations of “abusive or coercive questioning”).3  All this renders Vanderklok’s 
alternative-remedial-structure reasoning inapposite.   
Indeed, there are additional reasons to conclude that TRIP would almost certainly not 
provide Dyer any redress for his constitutional claims.  The TRIP website specifies that the 
program “is not designed to address travel issue [sic] related to . . . [d]elayed [sic] during travel 
                                                 
 
3 The TRIP website further provides that “[i]f your concern relates solely to a belief . . . that 
your civil rights have been violated, you may skip to Section ‘Incidents Related to Privacy’ of [the 
TRIP] form.”  DHS, Submitting the DHS TRIP Application, https://trip.dhs.gov/.  That section 
provides only the ability to check a box stating “I believe my privacy has been violated because a 
government agent has exposed or inappropriately shared my personal information” and to 
“describe incident [sic] related to the box(es) you have checked.”  DHS, TRIP Application, 
https://trip.dhs.gov/TRIP/Form/TripForm.  
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due to a disability or medical condition,” DHS, DHS TRIP Application Process FAQ, 
https://trip.dhs.gov/TRIP/Home/FAQPage.  Dyer’s allegations are at least arguably connected to 
a medical condition given that the TSA itself has called infant formula a “medically necessary 
liquid[].”  Press Release, TSA, TSA Reminds Travelers of Security Procedures for the Carnival 
Travel Season (May 2, 2019), https://www.tsa.gov/news/press/releases/2019/05/02/tsa-reminds-
travelers-security-procedures-carnival-travel-season.   
The TRIP website, under the heading “When does DHS TRIP Not Apply?,” further states 
that “[i]f you have questions or concerns regarding your experience at the [TSA] security screening 
checkpoint, please contact the TSA Contact Center.”  DHS, DHS TRIP Application Process FAQ, 
https://trip.dhs.gov/TRIP/Home/FAQPage.  This implies that screening-specific complaints do not 
fall within TRIP’s purview.4   
Finally, the same website section states that “[r]equests for claims or compensation” are 
inappropriate.  Id.  Supreme Court precedent makes clear that an alternative remedial structure 
need not provide damages to be relevant for Bivens purposes.  See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862–63.  
But the only remedy TRIP appears to provide is that “[a]ll relevant US Government records will 
be updated or corrected as appropriate,” DHS, DHS TRIP Application Process FAQ, 
https://trip.dhs.gov/TRIP/Home/FAQPage, with passengers receiving a “Redress Control 
Number” to “streamline[] the watch list matching process” for the future, DHS, Redress Control 
                                                 
 
4 Defendants say nothing about the TSA Contact Center, which (among other resources) 
provides an online “Complaint” form with a category for “Civil Rights and Liberties.”  TSA, 
Complaint, https://www.tsa.gov/contact-center/form/complaints.  Linlor, however, said the 
Contact Center appears to “afford[] individuals only the bare opportunity to make the TSA aware 
of a complaint,” which “is not the sort of alternative process that provides a ‘convincing reason 
for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages.’”  
263 F. Supp. 3d at 621–22 (quoting Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007)). 
Case 3:19-cv-00921-JAG   Document 30   Filed 12/11/20   Page 16 of 28 PageID# 117
 
11 
Numbers, https://www.dhs.gov/redress-control-numbers.  That relief does not respond in any way 
to Dyer’s claims. 
As in Bivens itself, it appears that “[f]or people in [Dyer’s] shoes, it is damages or nothing.”  
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) 
(Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).5 
2. The context of this case does not raise national-security concerns 
different from contexts in which Bivens claims are already allowed. 
Defendants point to national-security concerns surrounding airports as a special factor, 
arguing that subjecting TSA agents to Bivens actions would run a serious risk of making them 
timid in performing their important job duties.  It would be difficult to respond in a more complete 
and compelling way than Judge Cacheris did in Linlor: 
While the Court agrees that appreciable national security concerns would, if raised, 
preclude a Bivens remedy here, Defendant does not adequately explain how this 
case presents such concerns. . . . The relevant context here is a TSA officer’s 
alleged use of excessive force [under the Fourth Amendment] during an airport 
security screening. . . . Defendant’s [motion to dismiss] does little to tie specific 
national security concerns to the context under consideration. Rather, it rests 
primarily upon generalizations about the sui generis nature of the airport setting. 
Defendant is correct that Courts have consistently recognized airports as loci of 
special security concerns. . . . But that does not mean generic national security 
concerns bar any constitutional claim arising at an airport. 
263 F. Supp. 3d at 622–23 (paragraph breaks omitted).  For this proposition, Judge Cacheris cited 
Tobey and quoted Abbasi’s admonition that “national-security concerns must not become a 
                                                 
 
5 Defendants suggest that no relief exists here under the Federal Tort Claims Act and do 
not mention equitable or declaratory relief.  In any event, it is doubtful that these sources could 
supply an alternative remedy for Dyer’s alleged injuries.  There is a split among district courts in 
the Fourth Circuit over the relevance of the FTCA to the Bivens inquiry since Abbasi.  Doe v. 
United States, 381 F. Supp. 3d 573, 614–15 (M.D.N.C. 2019) (collecting cases).  And Dyer likely 
has no standing to seek equitable or declaratory relief.  See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 
95, 102, 104 (1983) (holding that to seek such remedies, plaintiffs must establish “a real and 
immediate threat of repeated injury” (internal quotation omitted)).  
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talisman used to ward off inconvenient claims.”  Id. at 623 (quoting 137 S. Ct. at 1862).   
 “The question,” Judge Cacheris continued, “is not whether airports present special security 
concerns—they do—but whether those concerns have any particular bearing on the context at issue 
in this case.”  Id.  The answer, he concluded, was no: 
The only specific concern Defendant identifies is the risk that implying a Bivens 
remedy here might chill legitimate TSA activity and discourage TSA officers from 
performing appropriately thorough security screenings.  The risk of deterring 
legitimate law enforcement activity through personal liability, however, is not 
unique to this context.  Indeed, it is a risk that inheres whenever courts imply a 
Bivens remedy.  Federal officers have, for nearly fifty years, navigated such 
concerns while performing Fourth Amendment searches.  Many of Defendant’s 
observations about the nature of the TSA’s work—for example, that TSA officers 
must make split second decisions in a fast moving environment to protect public 
safety—are no less applicable to the work of other federal agents who have 
successfully contended with Bivens liability. 
Id.  Judge Cacheris also reasoned that the conduct in question “is not conduct that the TSA has 
deemed necessary, or even desirable, to protect national security,” but was instead behavior in 
which “the TSA expressly forbids its officers to engage.”  Id. at 624. 
In short, Judge Cacheris explained, “Defendant provides no reason to believe that TSA 
officers will be uniquely deterred from the adequate performance of their duties if faced with 
Bivens liability.”  Id.  Refusing to recognize a cause of action on this ground, he said, “would 
essentially overrule Bivens.”  Id.  And in any event, he said, “it is the purpose of qualified immunity 
to provide TSA officers with the breathing room they require to operate effectively.”  Id. 
 All this logic applies here.  Defendants’ briefing “does little to tie specific national security 
concerns to the context under consideration.”  Id. at 623.  Rather, “[t]he only specific concern 
Defendant[s] identif[y] is the risk that implying a Bivens remedy here might chill legitimate TSA 
activity and discourage TSA officers from performing appropriately thorough security 
screenings.”  Id.  The conduct Dyer alleges “is not conduct that the TSA has deemed necessary, or 
even desirable, to protect national security,” but is instead behavior in which “the TSA expressly 
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forbids its officers to engage.”  Id. at 624.6 
There thus exists little reason for the Court to handle the invocation of national-security 
concerns here any differently than Linlor did.  To be sure, the Supreme Court in Hernández—
which postdates Linlor and involved the cross-border shooting of a Mexican teenager by a U.S. 
Customs and Border Patrol agent—took a very deferential approach to national-security issues.  
See 140 S. Ct. at 745–47.  Hernández suggests that courts should be alert to the possibility of 
Bivens-preclusive national-security implications any time a suit arises in a sensitive location.  See 
id. at 746.  But in Hernández, the Supreme Court specified that the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) “concluded that [the defendant] had not violated Customs and Border Patrol policy or 
training.”  Id. at 740.  Emphasizing that “‘[n]ational-security policy is the prerogative of the 
Congress and President,’” the Court expressed concern about “regulating the conduct of agents at 
the border” by “extending Bivens into this field.”  Id. at 746–47 (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 
1861).  Hernández is thus distinguishable here for the same reason that Linlor held previous cases 
rejecting Bivens relief on national-security grounds inapposite: “[t]here is no comparable risk of 
entangling the judiciary in sensitive matters of national security through second-guessing 
executive policy,” for “if anything, this action harmonizes with the TSA’s avowed policy.”  Linlor, 
263 F. Supp. 3d at 625.7   
                                                 
 
6 See TSA, Can I Film and Take Photos at a Security Checkpoint?, 
https://www.tsa.gov/travel/frequently-asked-questions/can-i-film-and-take-photos-security-
checkpoint (“TSA does not prohibit photographing, videotaping or filming at security checkpoints, 
as long as the screening process is not interfered with or sensitive information is not revealed.  
Interference with screening includes but is not limited to holding a recording device up to the face 
of a TSA officer so that the officer is unable to see or move, refusing to assume the proper stance 
during screening, blocking the movement of others through the checkpoint or refusing to submit a 
recording device for screening.  Additionally, you may not film or take pictures of equipment 
monitors that are shielded from public view.”). 
7 The Supreme Court in Hernández also differentiated between Border Patrol agents who 
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 Moreover, just as considerations about incentivizing appropriate behavior are already 
baked into the qualified-immunity inquiry, considerations about the general national-security 
issues involved in air travel are already baked into the constitutional-merits inquiries.  See, e.g., 
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47–48 (2000) (stating that the rule requiring 
individualized suspicion under the Fourth Amendment for general crime-control checkpoint stops 
“does not affect the validity of border searches or searches at places like airports and government 
buildings, where the need for such measures to ensure public safety can be particularly acute”); 
ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 607 (7th Cir. 2012) (in disapproving on First Amendment 
grounds a statute prohibiting the open recording of government officials performing their jobs in 
public, stating that “[n]othing we have said here immunizes behavior that obstructs or interferes 
with effective law enforcement or the protection of public safety”).  It makes little sense to double 
or even triple count these considerations by denying Bivens actions on their account.8 
 National-security concerns need not defeat Dyer’s assertion of Bivens claims against TSA 
                                                 
 
“work miles from the border” and those who “are stationed right at the border and have the 
responsibility of attempting to prevent illegal entry,” stating that “the conduct of [the latter] has a 
clear and strong connection to national security.”  140 S. Ct. at 746.  While the work of TSA 
officials within an airport setting does not present the same degree of geographic separation, the 
conduct of agents performing first-order screenings may involve less of “a clear and strong 
connection to national security” than does the conduct of other TSA officials—like specially 
designated law-enforcement officers, see 49 U.S.C. § 114, or federal air marshals.  Any 
determination regarding the functions of specific TSA officials would be more appropriate at the 
summary-judgment stage than on the basis of the current briefing. 
8 It is worth mentioning that any assumption that public officials generally bear financial 
responsibility for Bivens actions misses how the federal government appears to handle such suits.  
See James E. Pfander, Alexander A. Reinert, & Joanna C. Schwartz, The Myth of Personal 
Liability: Who Pays When Bivens Claims Succeed, 72 Stan. L. Rev. 561, 566 (2020) (“find[ing] 
that the federal government effectively held its officers harmless in over 95% of the successful 
cases brought against them, and paid well over 99% of the compensation received by plaintiffs” 
in the data set). 
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agents for their conduct in an airport screening line. 
3. None of the other concerns Defendants cite qualify as special factors. 
 Defendants assert that the lack of a damages remedy in statutory law is a special factor.  
But Defendants would have presumably argued that any express damages relief displaced Bivens 
as an alternative remedial structure.  In any event, Defendants do not point to an accumulation of 
negative implications from statutory law like the kind the Supreme Court found significant in 
Hernández.  See 140 S. Ct. at 749 (stating that a “pattern of congressional action”—specifically, 
“refraining from authorizing damages actions for injury inflicted abroad by Government officers, 
while providing alternative avenues for compensation in some situations” —provided “reason to 
hesitate about extending Bivens” to extraterritorial injuries). 
 Defendants also raise the potential need for additional training if TSA agents are subjected 
to Bivens suits.  But the training required to satisfy Fourth Amendment standards should be 
minimal.  The safety of the traveling public presents “special needs” justifying “departures from 
the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.”  Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 
U.S. 602, 620 (1989).  So where officials conduct these kinds of searches, the Supreme Court has 
said they must follow standardized procedures.  See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) 
(requiring standardized criteria or an established routine to govern the opening of containers during 
inventory searches to avoid their repurposing for general investigative aims).  These procedures 
may provide something of a safe harbor.  Indeed, the fact that the evidence showed the defendant 
had adhered to established procedures ultimately doomed the excessive-force claim in Linlor.  See 
Linlor v. Polson, No. 1:17-cv-0013, 2018 WL 10418979, at *4–5 (E.D. Va. Feb. 1, 2018) 
(concluding that because the pat-down occurred in compliance with TSA procedures, the search 
was reasonable and the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity).  The lesson a TSA agent 
would need to learn to avoid inflicting the kind of harm Dyer alleges is even simpler: follow the 
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agency’s policy allowing recording that does not interfere with the screening process or reveal 
sensitive information. 
Even in light of recent Supreme Court precedent, this matter presents a strong case for 
recognizing Fourth and First Amendment Bivens claims against TSA agents for conduct occurring 
in airport screening lines.  At the very least, the Court could recognize the Fourth Amendment 
claim alone, given its closer connection to Bivens itself.  Or the Court could recognize the First 
Amendment claim because of its integral connection to the Fourth Amendment claim, leaving 
broader questions about First Amendment claims for another day.  Finally, if the Court declines to 
expand Bivens to a new constitutional right, it should confine its reasoning to the airport setting, 
preserving the possibility that plaintiffs in different circumstances could pursue First Amendment 
claims against federal officials in the future.  
II. There are good reasons to reject Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity. 
Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity is fragmentary and flawed. 
A. Defendants have waived this defense for the Fourth Amendment claim. 
Defendants do not assert qualified immunity from Dyer’s Fourth Amendment claim and 
have therefore waived the defense for now.  See English v. Dyke, 23 F.3d 1086, 1090 (6th Cir. 
1994) (“[A] defendant who fails to timely assert the defense [of qualified immunity] prior to 
discovery may waive the right to avoid discovery but may nonetheless raise the issue after 
discovery on summary judgment or at trial.”). 
B. The First Amendment right appears to be clearly established. 
Defendants do assert qualified immunity from Dyer’s First Amendment claim—to some 
extent.  They relegate the first step of the analysis (regarding whether a constitutional violation 
occurred) to a footnote saying there is “good reason” to treat recording TSA agents and recording 
police officers differently without saying what that “good reason” might be.  The logic of the single 
Case 3:19-cv-00921-JAG   Document 30   Filed 12/11/20   Page 22 of 28 PageID# 123
 
17 
decision they cite is quite strained.  See Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, No. CIV 11-1009 JB/KBM, 
2013 WL 312881, at *54 (D.N.M. Jan. 14, 2013) (saying, among other things, that the plaintiff’s 
filming “diverted the attention of TSA employees, who could have assisted other passengers who 
had forgotten their identification and needed to proceed through the alternative screening 
procedures so as to be able to board their flights” and “could thus have resulted in delays to other 
passengers, causing them to incur increased costs”). 
Defendants rest almost the entirety of their argument on the second step of the analysis 
(regarding whether the right at issue was clearly established).  Contrary to their contention, the 
status of the right in other jurisdictions matters.  In Booker, the Fourth Circuit explained that “[i]n 
the absence of controlling authority that specifically adjudicates the right in question, a right may 
still be clearly established in one of two ways.”  855 F.3d at 543.  First, “[a] right may be clearly 
established if ‘a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law . . . appl[ies] 
with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question.’”  Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).  Second, “[a] right may also be clearly established 
based on a consensus of cases of persuasive authority from other jurisdictions.”  Id. (internal 
quotation omitted). 
Both pathways likely lead to clearly established law here.  The general constitutional rule 
identified in Tobey—that “the First Amendment protects peaceful nondisruptive speech in an 
airport, and that such speech cannot be suppressed solely because the government disagrees with 
it,” 706 F.3d at 391—applies with obvious clarity to Dyer’s allegations.  See Sorrell v. IMS Health 
Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 568 (2011) (confirming that the “right to speak is implicated when information 
[an individual] possesses is subjected to restraints on the way in which the information might be 
used or disseminated” (internal quotation omitted)); see also Taylor v. Riojas, No. 19-1261, 2020 
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WL 6385693, at *1 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2020) (per curiam) (reaffirming this method of defeating 
qualified immunity); Dean v. McKinney, 976 F.3d 407, 417–18 (4th Cir. 2020) (same).  Indeed, 
while identifying on-point circuit precedent to deny qualified immunity in a right-to-record case, 
the First Circuit also cited the idea that “some constitutional violations are ‘self-evident’ and do 
not require particularized case law to substantiate them.”  Glik, 655 F.3d at 84–85 (quoting Lee v. 
Gregory, 363 F.3d 931, 936 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
Moreover, a mass of persuasive authority holds that the First Amendment protects a right 
to record public officials.  According to a recent student note, “[w]ith the exception of the Tenth 
Circuit, courts in every circuit have held that there is a general First Amendment right to film 
police activities in public, subject to reasonable time, manner, and place restrictions.”  Doori Song, 
Note, Qualified Immunity and the Clear, but Unclear First Amendment Right to Film Police, 33 
Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 337, 342–44 (2019) (collecting cases).  In particular, the note 
tallies, “holdings of the courts of appeals in the First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits, and . . . district court holdings in the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits” 
recognized the right as of 2019, the year the incident in this case allegedly occurred.  Id. at 344.9  
DOJ has even taken the same position.  See Statement of Interest of the United States, Sharp v. 
Baltimore City Police Dep’t, No. 1:11-cv-02888-BEL, 2012 WL 9512053 (D. Md. Jan. 10, 2012) 
                                                 
 
9 The Eastern District is one of the district courts within the Fourth Circuit that has extended 
the First Amendment to a right to record police conduct.  See Szymecki v. City of Norfolk, No. 
2:08CV142, 2008 WL 11441862, at *4 (E.D. Va. Oct. 21, 2008).  After recognizing this right at 
the motion-to-dismiss stage, Judge Morgan granted the individual defendant qualified immunity 
at the summary-judgment stage, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed in a brief unpublished opinion 
stating that “the district court concluded that [the plaintiff’s] asserted First Amendment right to 
record police activities on public property was not clearly established in this circuit at the time of 
the alleged conduct” and that “we agree.”  Szymecki v. Houck, 353 F. App’x 852, 853 (4th Cir. 
2009) (per curiam).  The Fourth Circuit’s decision was not precedential, and the law in this area 
developed considerably over the subsequent decade. 
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(“The right to record police officers while performing duties in a public place, as well as the right 
to be protected from the warrantless seizure and destruction of those recordings, are not only 
required by the Constitution.  They are consistent with our fundamental notions of liberty, promote 
the accountability of our governmental officers, and instill public confidence in the police officers 
who serve us daily.”).   
Defendants suggest that this case is distinguishable because it pertains to TSA agents in an 
airport.  But the reasoning underlying right-to-record decisions applies to TSA agents.  See, e.g., 
ACLU of Ill., 679 F.3d at 600 (stating that “a foremost purpose of the Constitution’s guarantee of 
speech and press liberty is . . . ‘to enable every citizen at any time to bring the government and any 
person in authority to the bar of public opinion by any just criticism upon their conduct in the 
exercise of the authority which the people have conferred upon them’” (quoting Thomas M. 
Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 421–22 (1868)).  And speech restrictions in 
airports, as in other non-public forums, must still satisfy a reasonableness standard, Tobey, 706 
F.3d at 388 (citing Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683 (1992))—
something the conduct in question here, which contravenes TSA’s own policy, cannot do. 
For all these reasons, Defendants do not state a strong case for qualified immunity. 
CONCLUSION 
 There are good reasons to recognize Fourth and First Amendment Bivens actions against 
TSA agents and to reject Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity. Nevertheless, 
acknowledging the trend in Supreme Court decisions away from a robust Bivens regime and 
believing that the Court could justify ruling either way on the relevant issues, Amici write in 
support of neither party.  Amici urge the Court to consider the importance of video recording to 
exposing and prompting the reform of unlawful government practices.     
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